Ensure Transmission Reliability with a "Dictator"

ISO Dictator

System Voltage Control

Knowledge of MVAR loads and sources are key to transmission voltage control. Theory suggests MVAR sources should be located as close to the load as possible. With proper incentives, the economic distribution system operation can be at (or near) unity power factor at peak distribution system load; thus demanding little MVAR support from the transmission system. In this case, most of the transmission system MVAR loads are the system MVAR line and transformer losses. Since these MVAR source cannot be available instantaneously, someone (the ISO?) has to be aware of the need in sufficient time to provide the MVAR sources. Back to the benevolent dictator?

Fred P. Sener

Taking Responsibility

In addition to asking "Who is in Charge?" I would also suggest that we ask "Who is Responsible?" Will the PSRC write the rules and then assume the responsibility for implementing them? Or will they have the power— whatever and however that may be—to assign that responsibility to the operating utilities to implement solutions based on those written rules. The result could be that a utility may have to spend money on implementing an improvement to the overall system even though that improvement may not directly benefit them. That will be a challenge in this environment where the necessity of providing electrical power is determined not by those who understand how the system functions but by those who do not understand the system and only make decisions based on dollars and cents. Who is responsible?

This is reflected in the article "Shedding Light on Blackouts" in the same issue. On page 35 it describes the problem of a split in responsibility between ISOs and transmission asset owners that currently exists. Who is responsible?

Also, on page 38 of the same article it states that "Recent blackouts underscore the need for increased investment and deployment of well-defined and coordinated overall defense plans." That is a valid statement, but who is doing that now or will be doing that in the future? Who is responsible?

What options do utilities have for improving reliability of their transmission systems? One of the simplest methods of improving reliability is to build additional transmission lines, strengthen existing plants with larger conductors, or replace single circuits with double circuits on the same row.

However, that option is at best nearly impossible and at worst extremely expensive and time consuming. Because landowners, county governments, state agencies, federal agencies, politicians, and interveners all require detailed studies, reports, independent verification, multiple permits, etc., etc., transmission lines are not being built to the extent they are needed. Until the process of approving and routing of transmission systems is made more efficient and less costly, improvements in those systems will be difficult to justify economically and subsequently continue to be more difficult to implement. So, the decision to implement that option based on reliability criteria cannot be feasibly made.

To maintain the theoretical reliability standards that would most likely be written—even by the professional engineering community—would involve not only the cost of implementing new/revised transmission hardware but also would dramatically increase the complexity of constructing and operating the system.

What options does the operating utility have of implementing those requirements with efficient costing methods and minimum risk and then operating that system in a reliable manner? I would suggest that those options may be limited within the current environment. The utility could be potentially faced with federal requirements to improve reliability and not be able to do so because of state and other government entity restrictions.

The public is being faced with the intriguing tradeoff of whether to support the industry so they can "keep the lights on" or consider the presumed negative aesthetics of additional transmission systems within their field of vision and accept a less reliable system.

Someone once said "May you live in interesting times." We definitely are, and that is the challenge of it.

Ivars Vancers
Consultant

Pearson Prompts Thoughts of Spain

In 1972, I was asked by Bechtel Power Corp. (BPC) to supervise the electrical engineering design for construction of two 930-MW PWR nuclear power plants to be built on the Ebro River in Northern Spain, and our client was also Fuerzas Electrics de Catalunya, SA (FESCA). The project is identified as ASCO Nuclear Generating Stations 1&2, and the nuclear steam supply systems (NSSS) and turbine generators (T/G) were furnished by Westinghouse, USA.

While ASCO 1&2 are constructed near the same locale as the Seros' hydro-generating station, and both projects had the same client, these were only similarities. I cannot compare our efforts to the magnitude of Mr. Pearson's work and his great legacy in Northern Spain, I wish only to point out the present capabilities of the Spanish engineers.

Unlike the staffing of Mr. Pearson's projects with over 250 American engineers in 1914, our scope of work involved a minimal number of U.S. engineers. Initially, our project had an engineering project manager, with a supervisor and an assistant for each engineering discipline for a total of 15 U.S. engineering personnel. We helped set up an office in Madrid, and it was staffed with engineers and technical personnel from two established Spanish engineering firms.

Early on, the U.S. personnel had some concerns about completing our scope of work on an accelerated schedule; however, any qualms we had were short lived. We found the younger Spanish engineers very eager to learn about nuclear power plant technology, and their general engineering knowledge was most helpful, especially considering the project was involved with making many U.S.-to-metric conversions and sizing of equipment. European voltages and 50 Hz systems were utilized.

Safety (Class 1E), nonsafety related, and balance of plant equipment specs were written for worldwide suppliers and we evaluated all proposals for direct procurement by FESCA.

Many applicable IEEE nuclear standards, U.S.-NRC regulation guides, and Westinghouse and BPC safety standards were followed over the course of the project. The Spaniards and I especially looked forward to reading the latest technical articles in the IEEE periodicals relating to the nuclear industry.

In three years, major rebars were in place, concrete was poured, and most of the electrical equipment for the project was on order. I had completed my assignment, so I returned to the home office with my gratitude to the Spanish engineers and designers for their excellent cooperation and friendly hospitality.

The final inspections were made by BPC construction management, quality control, FESCA, and the Westinghouse technical teams who supervised the ongoing construction of the project, and, to my recollection, Unit 1 went online in about eight years.

D.W. Turnbull Jr., PE
Life Member, IEEE-PES & IAS